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FLORIDA’S STAND YOUR GROUND REGIME: 
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, 
PUBLIC PRESSURES, AND THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Mary Elizabeth Castillo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Headline trials—those that attract major public attention1—are of “high[] social 
importance,”2 and may be categorized along social, political, or other grounds.3  Such 
trials are one vehicle through which the media can frame the country’s social and 
political climate as part of a “larger American drama[,]” particularly in trials that 
implicate race relations.4  Notably, the shooting of Trayvon Martin, a black teenager, 
by George Zimmerman, a Hispanic male, initiated a national narrative concerning 
systemic disparities among races.5  Zimmerman’s subsequent prosecution became 
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 1.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Front Page: Notes on the Nature and Significance of Headline Trials, 55 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1243, 1245 (2011). 
 2.  Id. at 1245 (defining “major public attention” as “basically[] newspaper and other media coverage—
including books, movies, TV shows, and the like”). 
 3.  For example, the “tabloid trial” is a species of headline trial that “titillate[s] the public” and gains 
attention to its proceedings because of the nature of the crime itself.  Id.  On the other hand, a “celebrity trial” 
is notorious less because of the crime itself, than because either the “victim or the defendant is or was a famous 
public figure.”  Id. at 1257.  A “political trial” is a trial that either has or appears to have political overtones; 
however, this meaning—as well as a trial’s political significance—varies from trial to trial. Id. at 1249.  Yet, in 
the broadest sense, a trial may be considered political when it raises some important or polarizing issue of policy 
or principle.  Id. at 1251.  Political trials and those closely linked to political trials are arguably the most signif-
icant kind of headline trial.  Id. at 1255.  A separate category of headline political trials are those labeled political 
“only in the sense that anything that creates a stir[.]”  Id.  In that sense, political trials may be categorized along 
a spectrum, ranging from overtly political on one end to pure entertainment without a clear social meaning at 
the other.  Id. at 1255-56.  Tabloid and celebrity trials fall along the entertainment side, characterized generally 
as trials that “create a stir, [] fascinate the public, and command [media attention], even though they seem to 
have no impact other than on the immediate parties.”  Id. at 1256.  There are no bright-lines establishing the 
preceding categorizations, however, as the types of trials often overlap and/or fall into several of the categories.  
Id. at 1248. 
 4.  Id. at 1267. 
 5.  See Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound-A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin 
Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 271, 310 (2012) (“Race played a role in each major part of this case: the public’s outcry, the pros-
ecutors’ discretion, and the self-defense law.  Race is salient in the discussion of discretionary charging deci-
sions. . . Racial stereotypes are still part of American culture, and, by default, part of the American criminal 
justice system.”). 
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the headline to that narrative, and Florida’s self-defense laws and procedure became 
a channel of public attention.6 
 High-profile cases, such as Zimmerman’s, place the prosecutor amidst a con-
vergence of interests.7  Prosecutors generally have a duty to present the State’s case 
with earnestness and vigor, to give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, and to 
further the interests of the public at large.8  Put simply, the prosecutor must rigorously 
enforce the law and simultaneously ensure that any criminal charges filed can be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.9  Prosecutors face additional ethical constraints 
in high-profile cases with regard to publicity and media relations, charging decisions 
and pretrial discovery, and actual courtroom conduct.10  These added considerations 
significantly influence and complicate the prosecutor’s handling of headline criminal 
trials.11  One need not look further than the Zimmerman trial to see this interplay 
under Florida’s Stand Your Ground (“SYG”) regime.12 
 Section 776.032 of Florida’s SYG Law provides immunity from criminal pros-
ecution and civil action to one who uses force as justified under §§ 776.012, 776.013, 
or 776.031.13  The Court in Dennis v. State14 concluded that “the plain language of 
section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity from prose-
cution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.”15  This encompasses immunity not 
only from trial proceedings, but also from arrest, detention in custody, and possible 
charges brought as a result of the use of legally justified force.16  Thus, the Sanford 
Police did not—and indeed, under the statutory language, could not—arrest or charge 
 
 6.  See generally George C. Thomas III, Criminal Trials as Morality Plays: Good and Evil, 55 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1405 (2011) (presenting opinions and information concerning the relationship between criminal trials 
and cultural morality). 
 7.  See generally Paul R. Wallace, Prosecuting in the Limelight, 22 WTR DEL. LAW. 20, 20 (2005) (“The 
multifaceted duties of the prosecutor—to represent the state with a level of professionalism and ethics unequaled 
in other attorneys’ experiences—become even more demanding when the prosecution of a high-profile case is 
undertaken.”).  Wallace identifies two types of “high profile” criminal cases: (1) extraordinary individuals com-
mitting ordinary offenses, referencing Winona Ryder’s shoplifting as an example; and (2) ordinary people com-
mitting extraordinary crimes, referencing Andrea Yates drowning her five children.  Id. at 20.  Zimmerman’s 
case inevitably falls within the latter category.  See also Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 1-6 (2014) (analyzing and discussing the “binary opposition between politics and discretion” 
in the context of the Zimmerman case). 
 8.  Wallace, supra note 7, at 21. 
 9.  Lawson, supra note 5, at 284. 
 10.  Wallace, supra note 7, at 21. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See generally Sekhon, supra note 7, at 18 (“Prosecutors have the capacity to do more than just obtain 
convictions—they have the power to stir social and political meaning around contested social issues.  Criminal 
laws generally, and Stand Your Ground in particular, afford prosecutors considerable latitude with regard to 
bringing (or declining) cases.”).  See also, Wrobleski, infra note 17, at 113-14 (“Public pressure undoubtedly 
played a role in Angela Corey’s decision to quickly end and re-frame an investigation that conclusively pointed 
toward a legitimate act of self-defense.  The probable cause affidavit used to charge Zimmerman on April 11, 
2012 was rife with rushed conclusions that were tenuously supported at best by the results of the investigation 
to date.”) (internal footnotes omitted); Lawson, supra note 5, at 272-73 (“Fundamentally, the Martin killing 
is . . . about how one killing can trigger provocative issues so that public outcry and media coverage combine 
to ignite intense passion across the country and throughout the world.”). 
 13.  FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2014). 
 14.  51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010). 
 15.  Id. at 462. 
 16.  Id.  (“The statute does not merely provide that a defendant cannot be convicted as a result of legally 
justified force.”) (emphasis added). 
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Zimmerman in the weeks following the fatal confrontation without evidence disput-
ing his claim of self-defense.17  The State Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit 
then received the case and prepared to send it to a grand jury.18  However, that State 
Attorney was recused and a special prosecutor appointed pursuant to Executive Order 
12-72.19  On April 11, 2012, special prosecutor Angela Corey charged George Zim-
merman with second-degree murder by information.20  In light of this timeline, it is 
apparent that the decision to bring charges against Zimmerman was political—
brought only after a “national uproar erupted over Martin’s death[.]”21 
 The politically motivated prosecution of George Zimmerman demonstrates the 
influence that public pressures can have on a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion.22  It 
further represents the public’s “punitive impulse” to redress a perceived social or 
cultural harm through imposition of harsher penalties against the individual most eas-
ily connected to that harm.23 Thus, I argue that when a prosecutor succumbs to these 
emotionally incited pressures, it undermines her expertise, experience and exercise 
of discretion, and undercuts the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole.24 
 This Note seeks to examine the tripartite relationship between legislative dele-
gation, prosecutorial discretion, and public pressures in the context of Florida’s SYG 
regime.  Part I traces the origins of Florida’s SYG Laws from the modern castle doc-
trine through its legislative history.  Part II lays out the statutory scheme and relevant 
language.  Part III explores the contours of prosecutorial discretion under the SYG 
 
 17.  See Ex-Sanford Police Chief Tells Local 6 Why He Didn’t Arrest George Zimmerman, CLICK OR-
LANDO (July 10, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/exsanford-police-chief-tells-local-6-why-
he-didnt-arrest-george-zimmerman//1637132/20923726/-/f0eymsz/index.html.  See also Brandon T. 
Wrobleski, Note, Calling the Court of Public Opinion to Order: A Critical Analysis of State of Florida v. George 
Zimmerman, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 111 (2014-2015) (“On March 13, 2012, the [Sanford Police Depart-
ment] decided not to charge Zimmerman, citing a lack of probable cause to refute self-defense.”). 
 18.  Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 111. 
 19.  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 12-72, at pmbl, § 1 (2012), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/or-
ders/2012/12-72-martin_10-2.pdf.  See also Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Feb. 11, 
2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html. 
 20.  Information, State v. Zimmerman, No. 1712F04573, 2012 WL 1207410 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012).  
See also infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text; Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (last updated 
Feb. 11, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html. 
 21.  Sekhon, supra note 7, at 2.  See also Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 113; Lawson, supra note 5, at 272-
73. 
 22.  See Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 60 (2012). 
 23.  See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 967-68 (2014). 
 24.  See, e.g., Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1099, 1132 (2014) (“Limits on prosecutorial resources require that some crimes go unpunished so that prose-
cutors can attend to other, more troubling ones.  Not every violation of law merits pressing charges.  Prosecutors 
need the discretion to forego cases with slim evidentiary foundations, those with mitigating circumstances, or 
those with minimal adverse public consequences. . . . Because elected officials recognize that inflexible rules 
can lead to unjust results and an unwise allocation of prosecutorial time and energy, these officials properly 
delegate substantial enforcement discretion to prosecutors[.]”) (internal citations omitted).  See also Sekhon, 
supra note 7, at 3 (“Politics is a toxic force impelled by the public’s taste for vengeance.  By this account, a 
fearful and easily manipulated public readily embraces the ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric that politicians feed it.  
This dynamic, in turn, impels the creation of not just more criminal laws, but broader and harsher ones.  Leg-
islators are perfectly willing to pass these laws knowing that prosecutors will have the final say on what sort of 
cases are actually brought.  In other words, prosecutorial discretion is the check on politics’ punitive excesses.”) 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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regime, and places that discretion in the Zimmerman trial setting.  Lastly, Part IV 
analyzes the relationship between legislators, prosecutors and public pressures in the 
context of headline criminal trials involving Florida’s SYG regime. 
When a prosecutor allows public pressures to affect her exercise of discretion, 
the resulting decision becomes a political one.  While she necessarily must consider 
the greater public good in performance of her duties, and may be subject to some 
form of political accountability,25 her decision should be influenced by her own ex-
perience and expertise rather than by public opinion.  To give in to an emotionally 
aroused public in an effort to appear “tough on [this] crime [or situation]” not only 
leads to an inefficient allocation of resources, but also undermines the discretion del-
egated to her by the legislature.  In turn, these political moves undermine the legiti-
macy of the criminal justice system. 
This is not to say that public outrage at some law or circumstance should not play 
any role in our criminal justice system.  Indeed, the cornerstone of United States 
governance is that it be one “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”26  
Rather, my argument proceeds under the assumption that decisions in response to 
public outcry should come from legislators rather than prosecutors.  After all, in ex-
ercising her discretion, a prosecutor simply carries out a legislative directive.  Thus, 
the prosecutor’s initial declination to bring charges against Zimmerman was proper 
under the regime established by the Florida legislature. 
II. ORIGINS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
 The broad self-defense rights granted under Florida’s SYG Law are consistent 
with the principles embodied in the castle doctrine.27  The modern castle doctrine 
originates from the common law defense of habitation doctrine.28  However, defense 
of habitation was a separate doctrine from that of self-defense under the English com-
mon law system.29 
Common law recognition of the general privilege of self-defense as a justifica-
tion for one’s use of deadly force was limited by the doctrine of necessity.30  As such, 
one maintained a duty to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force.31  How-
ever, an exception was established to the duty to retreat—one had the right to stand 
 
 25.  See, e.g., FLA. CONST., Art. V § 17 (“In each judicial circuit a state attorney shall be elected for a term 
of four years.  Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the state attorney shall be the prosecuting 
officer of all trial courts in that circuit and shall perform other duties prescribed by general law[.]”) (emphasis 
added).  See also Sekhon, supra note 7, at 29 (noting that “most district attorneys are elected in municipal or 
county elections” and “local head prosecutors typically owe their jobs to local voters”). 
 26.  Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE,  http://www.abrahamlin-
colnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
 27.  See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 
4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 504-05 (2007) (identifying the “underlying principles of the privilege of 
non-retreat and protection of life, liberty, and property embodied in the original castle doctrine”).  Catalfamo 
further notes that the “right to stand one’s ground flows from notions of honor, chivalry, and the right to freedom 
from attack and violation entrenched in Southern society.”  Id. at 505. 
 28.  Id. at 506. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  See also Florida Legislation—The Controversy Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law—
Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 354 (2005) [hereinafter Florida Legislation] (noting 
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her ground and defend herself against an attack in her home.32  Thus, the common 
law doctrine of self-defense was based on the right to protect oneself from physical 
harm or conflict, and defense of habitation involved defense of one’s home against 
violation and intrusion.33  The common law preference for retreat stemmed from a 
concern that “the right to defend might be mistaken as the right to kill.”34 
However, this preference of the English common law system did not proliferate 
under United States law.35  The 1895 decision of Beard v. United States36 marks an 
approval of the modern castle doctrine by the Supreme Court.37  The idea that one 
attacked in her own home had no duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force was 
well accepted by the turn of the century.38  Where one reasonably believed that the 
use of deadly force was necessary to preserve her own life, such action was justi-
fied.39  This common law duty to retreat evolved similarly under Florida law.40 
Before passage of Florida’s SYG Law, a person could use deadly force in self-
defense only where she believed such force “necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm” to herself or another.41  However, even where deadly force was 
believed necessary, “a person [could] not resort to deadly force without first using 
every reasonable means within his or her power to avoid the danger, including re-
treat.”42  Still, Florida common law acknowledged that the duty to retreat did not 
apply to individuals using deadly force in response to an attack within her home, “so 
long as the deadly force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.”43  Thus, 
one maintained the right to defend her home and family against trespassers in Flor-
ida.44 
 
that a duty to retreat requires “a person acting in self-defense outside his or her home or workplace” to employ 
“every reasonable means to avoid the danger, including retreat, prior to the use of deadly force”). 
 32.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 505. 
 33.  Id. at 506 (“Thus, a man could be justified in standing his ground and using force, even deadly force, 
if it was necessary to protect his proprietary and dignitary interests in his home[.]”). 
 34.  Id. at 507 (quoting F. Baum & J. Baum, LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE 6 (1970)). 
 35.  Id. at 507-08 (“During the 1880s, United States law began to veer sharply from English common law.  
The American ideals of bravery and honor suited themselves to frontier life in a way that the English duty to 
retreat could not.  As the United States developed, so did the concept of the right to defend one’s honor, espe-
cially in the South and the Midwest.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 36.  Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895). 
 37.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 509 (“Beard had been convicted of the murder of a trespasser because 
the trial court instructed the jury that Beard had a duty to retreat before the use of deadly force, even on his own 
property.  In reversing Beard’s conviction, the Supreme Court noted that despite the overall U.S. and British 
duty to retreat before using deadly force, there had been a consistent exception in both British common law and 
the law of many U.S. jurisdictions that permitted a man to stand his ground when attacked in his home.”) (in-
ternal footnotes omitted). 
 38.  Id. at 509-10. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 512-22.  See also Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 
67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 832-35 (2013) (providing an overview of Florida’s SYG Law and comparing Flor-
ida’s self-defense law before and after SYG). 
 41.  Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).  See also Lave, supra note 40, at 832. 
 42.  Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See Wilson v. State, 11 So. 556 (Fla. 1892); Pell v. State, 112 So. 110 (Fla. 1929).  See also Catalfamo, 
supra note 27, at 513. 
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Although an individual possessed the right to defend her home against trespass-
ers, Florida courts struggled with the question of whether one could exercise this right 
against people with a legal right to be in the home.45  In Hedges v. State,46 the Florida 
Supreme Court extended the privilege of non-retreat to attacks by guests or invitees.47  
Later, in State v. Bobbitt,48 the Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict over 
whether the castle doctrine applied to attacks between co-occupants.49  There, the 
Court held that the castle doctrine could not apply where both parties “had equal 
rights to be in the ‘castle’ and neither had the legal right to eject the other.”50  Twenty 
years later, in Weiand v. State, the Court retreated from Bobbitt, citing an “increased 
understanding of the plight of domestic violence victims” as sound policy for not 
imposing a duty to retreat in attacks against co-occupants.51  Florida’s castle doctrine 
provided a privilege of non-retreat to persons attacked in their place of employment, 
52 but declined to extend the privilege to guests in another’s home53 or to include 
vehicles in the definition of one’s “castle.”54 
 Thus, a combination of statutory and common law comprised Florida’s self-
defense regime before SYG.55  With the Florida Supreme Court decision in Weiand, 
the confusion surrounding the castle doctrine and the duty to retreat appeared to be 
settled.56  However, the duty to retreat was abrogated from Florida’s self-defense 
regime with the passing of SYG in 2005.57 
 Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law significantly expanded a person’s right to 
use deadly force in self-defense.58  The National Rifle Association (NRA) played an 
instrumental role in getting the bill passed through the Florida Legislature.59  The 
Protection of Persons Bill,60 conceived by former NRA President Marion P. Hammer, 
 
 45.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 512-3. 
 46.  172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965). 
 47.  Id. at 826-27.  See also Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 513. 
 48.  415 So. 2d 724 (1982). 
 49.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 516. 
 50.  Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726. 
 51.  Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1054-55. 
 52.  Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
 53.  State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 417 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 54.  Baker v. State, 506 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 55.  See Michelle Jaffe, Up in Arms over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 NOVA L. REV. 
155, 170 (2005). 
 56.  Id. at 175. 
 57.  See infra Part II. 
 58.  Lave, supra note 40, at 835. 
 59.  Id. at 836.  See also Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 536-40 (“Legislative history indicates that both the 
House and Senate were aware that the Stand Your Ground law would have a significant impact on gun laws.  
First, although the Stand Your Ground law never mentions firearms, it deals with deadly force, which is defined 
by statute in Florida as including firing a firearm in the direction of another person.  Additionally, the fact that 
the National Rifle Association, led by former president and lobbyist Marion Hammer, sponsored the Stand Your 
Ground Law further corroborates the connection.  It is unsurprising, then, that the public has consistently char-
acterized the Stand Your Ground law as a ‘gun law.’”); Jaffe, supra note 55, at 178-80; A History of “Stand 
Your Ground” Law in Florida, NPR (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/20/149014228/a-history-of-
stand-your-ground-law-in-florida (“Well, this was an NRA bill, and this is a Republican-dominated legislature, 
so, you know, it passed pretty easily.”). 
 60.  H.B. 249, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).  Later, 
these Amendments came to be known collectively as the “Stand Your Ground” Law.  See Lave, supra note 40, 
at 832.  See also Elizabeth Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of Florida’s “Stand 
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sought to amend Florida’s self-defense legislation and immunity provisions.61  The 
bill passed unanimously in the Senate and by an overwhelming majority in the House 
of Representatives.62  It was signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005, 
and became effective on October 1, 2005.63 
 Thus, Florida became the first state to adopt SYG legislation as drafted and pro-
posed by the NRA.64  Florida’s comprehensive update of its self-defense laws pursu-
ant to successful lobbying prompted the NRA to increase its efforts in pushing for 
similar legislation across the country.65  In fact, since 2005, more than half of the 
states have either enacted or considered similar SYG legislation.66  Given the in-
volvement of the NRA and the statutory language concerning “deadly force,”67 the 
SYG regime is often characterized as a “gun law.”68  Indeed, both houses of the Flor-
ida Legislature were aware that the SYG regime would have a significant impact on 
gun laws.69  Nevertheless, the rationale for passing the SYG laws was to enable “law-
abiding [citizens] to protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and 
attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of them-
selves and others[.]”70 
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
 In 2005, the Florida legislature undertook to clarify and codify the common law 
“duty to retreat” in relation to the use of force in self-defense.71  As a result, Florida 
 
Your Ground” Laws, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1074-76; Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” 
Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 398-99 (2008). 
 61.  See Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 537-38.  See also Jennifer Randolph, How to Get Away with Murder: 
Criminal and Civil Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your Ground Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 612 
(2014). 
 62.  Randolph, supra note 61, at 612.  See generally Daniel Michael, Recent Development: Florida’s Pro-
tection of Persons Bill, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199 (2006) (discussing the Protection of Persons Bill and its legal 
implications). 
 63.  Randolph, supra note 61, at 612; Weaver, supra note 60, at 395.  See also Michael, supra note 62, at 
211. 
 64.  See, e.g., Megale, supra note 60, at 1075.  See generally Lave, supra note 40, at 836-39 for a detailed 
discussion of the NRA’s involvement and tactics in pushing for Florida’s SYG legislation. 
 65.  See Randolph, supra note 61, at 614. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  FLA. STAT. § 776.06(1) (Fla. 2005). 
 68.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 537-38. 
 69.  Id.  In a footnote, Catalfamo notes that “[l]egislative history confirms what could otherwise be as-
sumed from Florida culture.”  Id. at n.151.  This “Florida culture” seemingly refers to the “right of people to 
bear arms in defense of themselves” as guaranteed by § 8 of Article I of the State Constitution, as well as the 
association of the State with gun laws and violence.  Id. at 536, n.151. 
 70.  Weaver, supra note 60, at 398-99.  Compare Megale, supra note 60, at 1076-77 (SYG laws “were 
supposed to prevent innocent people acting in self-defense from having to defend themselves or worry about 
being prosecuted . . . [i]n other words, the legislature intended to empower individuals in the community to take 
matters into their own hands.”) (internal footnotes omitted), with Elizabeth B. Megale, Disaster Unaverted: 
Reconciling the Desire for a Safe and Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 255 (2013) [hereinafter Disaster Unaverted] (giving an account of how the legislature’s passing 
of SYG went too far in liberalizing the justifiable use of force under Florida’s self-defense regime), and Lave, 
supra note 40, at 848-57 (identifying problematic aspects of SYG: creation of an incentive to kill—”shoot first, 
ask questions later” mentality; the lowering of state legitimacy because it “fosters racism and encourages people 
to break the law;” and the fact that studies show SYG does not deter violent crime). 
 71.  See Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 523-24. 
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legislators substantially amended chapter 776 by a series of enactments collectively 
known as the “Stand Your Ground Law.”72  This law abrogates the common law duty 
to retreat73 and generally authorizes the use of force in self-defense, or in defense of 
others.74  Significantly, the act authorizes the use of deadly force when such force is 
reasonably believed necessary to prevent imminent death, great bodily harm, or the 
commission of a “forcible felony,” and the person using such force “is presumed to 
have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself or another[.]”75 
 Chapter 2005-07 amended two existing statutes,76 and it created two new stat-
utes.77  As amended, § 776.012 provides that “[a] person is justified in using force, 
except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably 
believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against 
the other’s imminent use of unlawful force.”78  However, a person is justified in the 
use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if: 
He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent im-
minent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to 
prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony; or 
Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013 [which per-
mits use of defensive force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm in a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle].79 
As such, justifiable use of deadly force in self-defense applies in situations where 
an individual is attacked in a place where she has a lawful right to be, and she rea-
sonably believes such conduct is necessary.80 
One who uses deadly force in her “dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle”81 
in response to an attack or an unlawful entry is presumed to have held reasonable fear 
of “imminent peril or great bodily harm” under § 776.013.82  However, this presump-
tion does not apply in those circumstances enumerated in § 776.013(2).83  Situations 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 524-25. 
 74.  When self-defense is asserted in a criminal case, the defendant only has the burden of presenting “some 
evidence” to establish a prima facie case that the killing was justified.  See, e.g., Sipple v. State, 972 So. 2d 912 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Adams v. State, 727 So. 2d 997, 999-1000 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Bolin 
v. State, 297 So.2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1974).  The state must then 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 942 
So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied, 950 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2007); Fowler v. State, 921 So. 2d 
708, 711-12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Romero v. State, 901 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); 
Andrews v. State, 577 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 587 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1991). 
 75.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2014). 
 76.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012 and 776.031 (2014). 
 77.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 776. 013 and 776.032 (2014). 
 78.  FLA. STAT. § 776.012  (2014). 
 79.  F LA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014). 
 80.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 524. 
 81.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2014). 
 82.  See Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 524 (emphasis added). 
 83.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2) (2014).  The presumption of § 776.013(1) does not apply if (a) [t]he person 
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where a person may be justified in using force or deadly force to protect property are 
governed by § 776.031.84  In essence, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law effectively: 
expands the castle doctrine by expending the concept of what is a “castle” 
and by expanding the group of persons entitled to the castle’s protection.  
Under the castle doctrine, a person has no duty to retreat from his or her 
“castle,” a person’s home or workplace, before resorting to deadly force 
necessary for self-defense.  [Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law] expand[s] 
the concept of the castle to include attached porches, any type of vehicle, 
and place of temporary lodging, including tents.  Under the castle doctrine, 
only persons lawfully residing in a dwelling have no duty to retreat before 
resorting to deadly force necessary for self-defense.  [Florida’s Stand Your 
Ground Law gives] invited guests in another person’s “castle” . . . the 
same rights to self-defense as a resident of the expanded castle.85 
Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil suit for anyone using permissive 
force is provided for in § 776.032.  That section provides that one using force as 
permitted by §§ 776.012, 776.013, or 776.031, “is immune from criminal prosecution 
and civil action for the use of such force” subject to certain exceptions.86  Under the 
statute, a defendant is not limited to asserting an affirmative defense at trial that her 
use of force was legally justified.  The law provides that agencies may “use standard 
procedures for investigating the use of force,” but may not arrest the person using 
force unless probable cause exists “that the force . . . used was unlawful.”87  As the 
Florida Supreme Court explained: 
Section 776.032 contemplates that a defendant who establishes entitlement 
to the statutory immunity will not be subjected to trial.  Section 776.032(1) 
expressly grants defendants a substantive right to not be arrested, detained, 
 
against whom the defensive force is used or threatened has a right to be in or is a lawful resident of the [location], 
and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no 
contact against that person; or (b) [t]he [person(s)] sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise 
in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used 
or threatened; or (c) [t]he person who uses or threatens to use defensive force is engaged in a criminal activity 
or is using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further a criminal activity; or (d) [t]he person against 
whom the defensive force is used or threatened is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14)[.]  Id. 
 84.  “A person is justified in using or threatening to use force[] . . . against another when and to the extent 
that the person reasonably believes . . . necessary to prevent or terminate the other’s trespass on, or other tortious 
or criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or 
her possession or in the possession of [others] or of a person whose property he or she has a legal duty to 
protect.”  FLA. STAT. § 776.031(1) (2014) (emphasis added).  “A person who uses or threatens to use force in 
accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  The use of deadly force is addressed in § 776.031(2).  See FLA. STAT. § 776.031(2) 
(2014).  See also Florida Legislation, supra note 31, at 354. 
 85.  See Florida Legislation, supra note 31, at 355 (citing Judiciary Comm. SB 436 Staff Analysis, at 6). 
 86.  Namely, immunity does not apply where “the person against whom force was used or threatened is a 
law enforcement officer . . . who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer 
identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using or threatening to use 
force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer.  FLA. STAT. § 
776.032(1) (2014).  Additionally, “criminal prosecution” is defined to include arrest, detainment in custody, 
and charging or prosecuting the defendant.  Id. 
 87.  FLA. STAT. § 776.032(2) (2014). 
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charged, or prosecuted as a result of the use of legally justified force.  The 
statute does not merely provide that a defendant cannot be convicted as a 
result of legally justified force.88 
For example, the use of force might be unlawful if a person is found to have acted 
without a reasonable belief of necessity, or if she was not in a place she had the right 
to be.89  In any situation, this immunity clause provides an additional procedural hur-
dle in the form of a pre-trial determination.90  If the defendant successfully proves 
her claim of self-defense to the judge at the pre-trial hearing, the case is dismissed.91  
Immunity is granted by judicial order alone, thereby removing the case from being 
tried by a jury, and withdrawing the defendant from criminal prosecution for her use 
of deadly force.92 
 Ultimately, the statutory scheme established by Florida’s Stand Your Ground 
Law abrogates the duty to retreat before using deadly force.93  Initially, critics feared 
that this scheme—built upon hard, bright-line rules and presumptions that appear to 
do away with common law considerations of necessity and proportionality—went 
too far in liberalizing the use of force.94  Because Florida is a “high-crime state with 
heavy urbanization, a massively overcrowded prison system, and an extremely di-
verse (and often tense) racial population[,]” it appeared to have “all the ingredients 
for . . . disaster” with laws involving deadly force.95  Indeed, cases applying the stat-
ute are a particularly difficult breed of cases that must be analyzed closely before any 
decisions to prosecute are made.96 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION UNDER FLORIDA’S STAND YOUR GROUND LAW 
 The prosecutor, as a member of the executive branch, has complete discretion 
in deciding whether to prosecute and how to conduct a prosecution.97  Any decision 
to prosecute is within the prosecutor’s discretion where there is probable cause to 
believe the accused has committed an offense.98  Further, charging decisions made 
 
 88.  Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462. 
 89.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 525. 
 90.  Lawson, supra note 5, at 288. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Catalfamo, supra note 27, at 504. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. (quoting Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue: The New Wave of Concealed Hand-
gun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 690 (1995)). 
 96.  Lawson, supra note 5, at 287. 
 97.  See generally Garnett v. State, 87 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Greaux, 977 
So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Gibson, 935 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); 
State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986). 
 98.  See generally Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1984); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
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by the prosecutor are largely unreviewable by courts.99  In State v. Bloom,100 the 
Florida Supreme Court held that article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution pro-
hibits the judiciary from interfering with the discretionary executive function of a 
prosecutor.101  Thus, the prosecutor’s initial charging decision is usually the final 
word on the matter, and “no court, judge, citizen, or any other person can force a 
prosecutor to file charges in a case.”102 
 The prosecutor’s ability to bring charges against an individual depends on a 
statutory grant of authority from the legislature.  The passing of criminal laws allows 
the legislature to appear “tough on crime” while handing off the duty of law execution 
to the executive—that is, the prosecutor.103  In fact, where the surrounding political 
climate fuels a “tough on crime” rhetoric, legislators are willing to pass these laws 
knowing that prosecutors ultimately decide which cases are actually brought.104 
 Charging decisions under SYG are “fact intensive excavations in which the 
prosecutor is focused on whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the criminality 
of the suspect beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of any criminal de-
fenses . . . raised.”105  Due to certain evidentiary challenges and procedural obstacles, 
all “stand your ground cases” in Florida are challenging to evaluate and prosecute.106  
Overall, SYG has illuminated procedural and substantive implications for criminal 
defendants and citizens alike, and has perpetuated a debate concerning justifiable use 
of deadly force.107 
 Indeed, this debate was vibrant long before the confrontation between George 
Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin and the public outcry against SYG in response.  
 
 99.  See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining 
that a court cannot order a prosecutor to file criminal charges); Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (The prosecutor’s 
“(B)road discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to 
judicial review.  Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Gov-
ernment’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are 
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”). 
 100.  State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986). 
 101.  Id. at 3.  That Court cited the principles enumerated in federal courts as underlying its holding, specif-
ically that the “decision of whether or not to prosecute in any given instance must be left to the discretion of the 
prosecutor.  This discretion has been curbed by the judiciary only in those instances where impermissible mo-
tives may be attributed to the prosecution, such as bad faith, race, religion, or a desire to prevent the exercise of 
the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
 102.  Lawson, supra note 5, at 289. 
 103.  See Sekhon, supra note 7, at 7. 
 104.  Id. at 3.  See also Lawson, supra note 5, at 284-86.  Lawson notes that charging decisions are discre-
tionary, and ultimately controversial, because the law is complex, and not all crimes that are identified are 
charged.  Id. at 285.  “In actuality, there are fundamental policy goals that drive decisions to charge and not to 
charge.  Further, these policy goals often change depending on the politics of the current prosecutor in power, 
including the prosecutor’s vision and priorities.  Thus, purely legal issues are not the sole factors considered 
when making charging decisions.”  Id. 
 105.  Lawson, supra note 5, at 287-88. 
 106.  Id. at 288.  Lawson further explains, “(I)t is normal for a prosecutor to be cautious before charging 
this type of case, and it may even be reasonable for the prosecutor to elect not to charge it after weighing all the 
factors.”  Id.  “Objectively speaking, it is neither just nor unjust not to charge; instead, it is a commentary on 
the overall strength of case in the subjective view of the prosecutor at the time the decision is made.” id.  
“Whether right or wrong, it is exclusively within the prosecutor’s discretion to make this weighty determina-
tion.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 107.  See generally Florida Legislation, supra note 31.  See also Ahmad Abuznaid et al., “Stand Your 
Ground” Laws: International Human Rights Law Implications, 68 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 1129 (2014). 
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Notably, both prosecutors and law enforcement expressed opposition to the law be-
fore it was passed.108  While it is reasonable to believe that the legislature should 
have given greater weight to those opinions when considering the legislation, SYG 
nonetheless “overwhelmingly passed and remains in force.”109  Thus, by passing 
SYG into law, the Florida legislature imposed on prosecutors the duty to seek justice 
and prosecute individuals who violate that law in accordance with their executive 
function.110 
 Initially, it appeared that SYG acted more as a “bar to prosecution than a de-
fense.”111  While the law did not turn “Florida into the Wild West, nor [did] it cause[] 
a demonstrable increase in homicides[,]” it inevitably influenced decisions “whether 
to prosecute at all or bring reduced charges against individuals using deadly force.”112  
This is because the additional layer of protection afforded to an individual acting in 
self-defense under SYG—that is, pre-trial determination of immunity from civil and 
criminal prosecution113 in addition to an affirmative defense at trial—must also be 
considered by the prosecutor when making charging decisions.114  That consideration 
further complicates an already complicated decision-making process through which 
prosecutors exercise their discretion.115 
 Moreover, prosecutorial discretion to bring charges against an individual assert-
ing self-defense under SYG is limited by law enforcement’s investigation and han-
dling of incidents.116  Under § 776.032(2), the police cannot arrest or detain an indi-
vidual unless there exists probable cause that the force used was unlawful.117  Thus, 
situations where the police cannot find probable cause to make an arrest at the scene 
 
 108.  See Weaver, supra note 60, at 401-03 (“As agents of the State, prosecutors and law enforcement 
groups are charged with the duty to enforce the law.  In Florida, both groups publicly voiced their opposition to 
the “Stand Your Ground” law, but unfortunately the legislature did not seem to listen.”). 
 109.  Id. at 403. 
 110.  Id. at 401-02. 
 111.  Id. at 406.  Weaver later states that the “assertion that the law acts more as a bar to prosecution than a 
defense cannot be fully substantiated[] . . . because statistics on the number of self-defense claims statewide, 
either before or after the law took effect, [were] not available.”  Id. at 407. 
 112.  Id. at 407. 
 113.  See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014).  See also notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
 114.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 5, at 286-88; see also Weaver, supra note 60, at 406-08. 
 115.  For example, MacLean and Wilks list the following questions that face a prosecutor in nearly every 
case when making decisions: Is additional investigation needed?  What evidence is admissible?  Is there suffi-
cient admissible evidence to support the charges?  Should the suspect be charged with any offense?  If so, what 
charges should be brought?  When should the charges be brought?  What bail and release conditions should be 
sought?  What are the discovery obligations?  What are the victims’ wishes?  What are the offender’s circum-
stances and criminal history?  What has been done in similar cases and similar situations?  What is the optimal 
mix of retribution, restitution, and rehabilitation?  What does “justice” require?  MacLean & Wilks, supra note 
22, at 68-69.  Amidst a similar discussion, Lawson notes “the act of charging itself indicates that the prosecution 
has confidence in the incriminating evidence and believes that there is a high probability of a conviction at trial, 
having first overcome all the necessary obstacles.”  Lawson, supra note 5, at 289; see also id. 288-90 (emphasis 
added). 
 116.  See Weaver, supra note 60, at 408-09 (SYG “legislation altered how law enforcement assesses and 
handles incidents involving self-defense claims.”). 
 117.  See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(2).  See also Weaver, supra note 60, at 409 (“[A]lthough the law requires 
self-defense claims to be investigated, an individual claiming he or she acted in self-defense cannot even be 
arrested unless the police have evidence that the person’s actions do not fit within the requirements of the 
statute.”) (emphasis added). 
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of an incident impacts subsequent investigations.118  Indeed, the prosecutor may have 
a lesser expectation of successfully obtaining a conviction against an individual at 
trial where law enforcement’s investigation fails to establish probable cause for an 
arrest under SYG.119 
 As such, the failure of the Sanford Police Department to find probable cause to 
warrant Zimmerman’s arrest likely lowered the prosecutor’s expectation of obtaining 
a conviction in that case.120  Norm Wolfinger, the State Attorney for the Eighteenth 
Judicial Circuit, thus elected to submit Zimmerman’s fate to a grand jury.121  How-
ever, when special prosecutor Angela Corey took over the case,122 she chose to bring 
charges by information rather than proceeding with the grand jury.123  Not only was 
her decision politically motivated,124 it was arguably improper to remove the charg-
ing decision from the grand jury.125 
 
 118.  See Weaver, supra note 60, at 409-10 (Weaver reviews the effect of § 776.032(2) as illustrated by five 
months of court records for six different counties in Florida.  “Assessment of the records uncovered that some 
incidents received over twenty hours of investigation by detectives, while others were sent straight to the pros-
ecutors’ offices and were never reviewed by detectives.”  Weaver goes on to compare three incidents in an 
attempt to illustrate the “varying methods of investigating cases by law enforcement.”  Weaver notes that 
“[s]ome investigators argue that the law has not changed how incidents are assessed and investigated by law 
enforcement agencies[,]” while others “assert the opposite conclusion.”  Weaver concludes the section through 
recognition that “[t]he varying amounts of time spent investigating and the different methods for handling inci-
dents involving claims of self-defense under the law is difficult to reconcile with the desire for the law to be 
applied uniformly.  Because cases are not handled uniformly, too much discretion may be vested in law en-
forcement.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 119.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 5, at 292 (“Despite the public’s opinion, for the prosecutor, most of the 
analysis of a criminal case is in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).  This proposition may be further inferred from arguments that SYG has made it “easier to get away 
with murder” in Florida.  See Megale, supra note 60, at 1078-79 (concluding a discussion of the Florida Legis-
lature as a participant in the SYG regime that “[b]ecause “Stand Your Ground” has virtually eliminated the 
police and prosecutor roles in many homicides, legal control has vanished”); Lave, supra note 40, at 848-50 
(“The presumption of acting lawfully in conjunction with no duty to retreat constitutes a de facto license to hunt 
and kill suspected criminals, and makes it easier for a person to murder someone and pass it off as self-de-
fense.”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 5, at 289 (“In the case of Trayvon Martin’s killing, in addition to other 
issues surrounding the case, the prosecutors were forced to consider the contours of the Stand Your Ground 
Law and its impact on a successful conviction of the killer.  The knowledge of legal and procedural complexities 
of self-defense cases in Florida may help explain why the initial prosecutorial decision was not to charge murder 
for this homicide.”). 
 121.  See, e.g., Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 111. 
 122.  See FLA. EXEC. ORDER NO. 12-72 (2012), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2012/12-
72-martin_10-2.pdf. 
 123.  See Information, supra note 20.  See also Affidavit of Probable Cause—Second Degree Murder, State 
v. Zimmerman (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/336022/zimmerman-prob-
able-cause-document.pdf. 
 124.  See Sekhon, supra note 7, at 2 (“Angela Corey’s ultimate decision to prosecute George Zimmerman 
could not have been anything but “political.”“); Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 113 (noting that “the pressure on 
Corey to charge Zimmerman was immense”); supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.  See also Douglas O. 
Linder, The George Zimmerman Trial: An Account, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zimmer-
man1/zimmermanaccount.html (last visited April 8, 2015) (“State Attorney Angela Corey filed charges against 
Zimmerman under heavy political pressure to do so.  But political pressure should not decide who gets charged 
with a crime and who does not.  The facts of a case should decide that.”). 
 125.  See Bennett L. Gershman & Joel Cohen, Charging George Zimmerman: Why Bypass the Grand Jury?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/george-zim-
merman-grand-jury_b_1445714.html (“[T]he prosecutor has chosen in a controversial case of such magni-
tude . . . to use Florida’s escape hatch [charging a crime by information], thereby foregoing a procedure de-
signed by the Magna Carta to protect a defendant from unwarranted accusations.”). 
2016] Journal of Legislation 77 
 In Florida, an indictment is required for capital offenses, or those punishable by 
death or life imprisonment.126  The Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o person 
shall be tried for [a] capital crime without presentment or indictment by a grand 
jury[.]”127  Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder,128 which carries a 
maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but is not considered a capital offense. 129  
However, the legislative committee notes on indictments and informations “indicates 
that the decision to charge a person by information rather than grand jury indictment, 
while within a Florida prosecutor’s discretion, is disfavored when employed by pros-
ecutors not elected in the jurisdiction”—that is, Corey.130  Not only did Corey disre-
gard public input when she charged Zimmerman by information as “an appointed and 
unelected prosecutor with no allegiance or [political] accountability,”131 she also pur-
sued a charge that was seemingly unsupported by the facts of the case.132  In fact, 
Corey’s decision to charge Zimmerman with second-degree murder was criticized by 
several legal analysts.133  Thus, Corey’s exercise of discretion—motivated by public 
 
 126.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Bosek, et. al, Capital felonies, 14B FLA. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW—PROCEDURE § 
1133 (2015) (“In some jurisdictions, including Florida, an indictment is required only for capital offenses, or 
those punishable by death or life imprisonment[.]”). 
 127.  FLA. CONST., Art. I § 15. 
 128.  See Information, supra note 20. 
 129.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) (Westlaw through Ch. 255, 2014 Spec. “A” Sess.).  But see Gershman 
& Cohen, supra note 125 (“But a charge of murder in the second degree is hardly a “run-of-the-mill” offense, 
especially given that a conviction could bring a life sentence for the accused.”). 
 130.  Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 112 (emphasis added).  See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140, and com-
mittee notes at (a)(1)-(2) (“In courts not having elective prosecutors, prosecution by information is not recom-
mended because of the [] doubt as to the authority of a nonelected prosecutor to use an information as an accu-
satorial writ. . . . While practicalities dictate that most non-capital felonies and misdemeanors will be tried by 
information or affidavit, if appropriate, even if an indictment is permissible as an alternative procedure, it is 
well to retain the grand jury’s check on prosecutors in this area of otherwise practically unrestricted discre-
tion.”). 
 131.  Wrobleski, supra note 17, at 112-13. 
 132.  Many believed that manslaughter would have been a more appropriate charge against Zimmerman, 
and more likely to obtain a conviction.  See infra note 133.  See also Gershman & Cohen, supra note 125 (On 
removing the charging decision from the grand jury: “[W]as Corey concerned that the murder case was weak 
and difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, so that she wanted to avoid key witnesses giving one version 
of their recollections under oath at the grand jury, and somewhat different versions at trial, thereby subjecting 
them to impeachment by a skilled defense attorney?”); Bellamy v. Florida, 977 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008) (an “impulsive overreaction to an attack or injury” was held insufficient to prove the prerequisites 
for second-degree murder). 
 133.  See Linder, supra note 124 (“Several legal analysts, including Harvard law professor Alan Dershow-
itiz, criticized Corey’s action, suggested that she over-charged, and that the evidence could not support a murder 
charge.”); Alan Dershowitz, On Prosecutor Angela Corey’s Rant About My Criticism of Her, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 5, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/prosecutor-angela-corey-
r_b_1571942.html (“I criticized her for filing a misleading affidavit that willfully omitted all information about 
the injuries Zimmerman had sustained during the “struggle” it described.  She denied that she had any obligation 
to include in the affidavit truthful material that was favorable to the defense.  She insisted that she is entitled to 
submit what, in effect, were half truths in an affidavit of probable cause, so long as she subsequently provides 
the defense with exculpatory evidence.”); James Joyner, Dershowitz: Zimmerman Arrest Affidavit “Irresponsi-
ble and Unethical”, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/dershowitz-
zimmerman-arrest-affidavit-irresponsible-and-unethical/ (“Derschowitz has made a career of hyperbole but I 
think he’s right here.  As Doug Mataconis noted when the charges were filed late Wednesday, the evidence here 
points to manslaughter, not murder.  Alas, prosecutors routinely overcharge and stack charges, especially in 
high profile cases, in order to appear “tough on crime” and to raise the stakes in order to coerce a plea to a more 
reasonable charge.”).  See generally Josh Levs, Trayvon Martin Case Has a Tough, Controversial Prosecutor, 
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pressures, politically unchecked, and unlikely to establish Zimmerman’s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt134—undermined the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in 
that case.135 
V. PUBLIC PRESSURES AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. George Zimmerman 
 Undoubtedly, Corey’s decision to charge Zimmerman appeased the public’s pu-
nitive impulse at the time.  Trayvon Martin’s death became a national movement, and 
communities rallied to vindicate the perceived injustice of the situation.136  The me-
dia attention and public pressures surrounding the case pushed Corey to prosecute 
Zimmerman for second-degree murder, despite the arguable impropriety of the de-
gree and manner in which the charge was brought.137  As a result, George Zimmer-
man’s trial emerged as the headline story of every media outlet and American house-
hold.138 
 Despite Corey’s “political” prosecution, however, the jury acquitted Zimmer-
man of second-degree murder and the focus of national dialogue shifted to Florida’s 
 
CNN (Apr. 11, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/10/justice/florida-teen-shooting-prosecutor/ (dis-
cussing Corey’s reputation as “a tough prosecutor ready to pursue what she believes is right, even in the face of 
media glare and public pressure”). 
 134.  See, e.g., Doug Matacomis, Trayvon Martin Case Will Not Go to Grand Jury, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY 
(Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/trayvon-martin-case-will-not-go-to-grand-jury/ (“Given the 
nature of the self-defense claim that Zimmerman will obviously raise in this case, [Corey] may have feared that 
a grand jury would have refused to indict based on the evidence, which would have been politically troublesome 
to say the least.”). 
 135.  Cf. Lawson, supra note 5, at 291-92 (“Although from the prosecutorial standpoint the charging deci-
sion is focused on the criminality of the suspect and not on the individuality of the victim, it is sometimes hard 
for the public to separate the two.  The public perception of criminal law mostly views the case from a victim-
centered perspective.  Often times when charges are not filed in a case, the public’s objection to the decision 
highlights a perceived indifference of the prosecutor toward the victim.  Despite the public’s opinion, for the 
prosecutor, most of the analysis of a criminal case is in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 136.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 5, at 283 (“Communities all over were chanting the slogan: “I am 
Trayvon.”  Students of Trayvon’s age group and younger were walking out of school in symbolic rage regarding 
the fact that nothing was being done to vindicate his killing.  People from all walks of life were wearing hoodies 
in solidarity with the perceived injustice of the treatment of the case.”).  See also CNN WIRE STAFF, From Coast 
to Coast, Protesters Demand Justice in Trayvon Martin Case, CNN (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/26/justice/florida-teen-shooting-events/index.html?iref=allsearch; Brock Parker, 
Harvard Square Protest Mounted Over Trayvon Martin Shooting, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2012), http://arti-
cles.boston.com/2012-03-23/yourtown/31230778_1_large-protest-fatal-shooting-protest-organizers; ‘Hoodies’ 
unite for Trayvon Martin, SBS WORLD NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/arti-
cle/1639321/Hoodies-unite-for-Trayvon-Martin; Brian Hamacher & Lisa Orkin Emmanuel, High School Stu-
dents Walk Out In Protest of Trayvon Martin Shooting, NBC MIAMI (Mar. 23, 2012), http://us-
news.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/23/10830314-high-school-students-walk-out-in-protest-of-trayvon-
martin-shooting?lite. 
 137.  See discussion supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 5, at n.71 (“Every media outlet was covering the story.”), and 294-95 
(“Based on the breadth, intensity, and duration of the public outcry to the Trayvon Martin killing, and the lack 
of corresponding criminal charges, the atmosphere became increasingly tense. . . . [A]s the media attention con-
tinued to swarm the case, the politics arguably shifted, and maybe the legal analysis did as well.”) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
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SYG regime.139  Though the rationale and purpose of SYG was legitimate,140 public 
mobilization in reaction to Zimmerman’s acquittal pushed the Florida Legislature to 
reevaluate the law.141  While the House ultimately rejected the proposed repeal,142 
this legislative response to public pressures illustrates the appropriate political mech-
anism through which such action should occur.  Rather than assuming control of the 
case by circumventing the grand jury screening process and overcharging Zimmer-
man, Corey should have brought the case to a grand jury and sought appropriate 
charges under which she surely would have obtained a conviction.143  Her surrender 
 
 139.  See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 23, at 977 (“[M]any commentators interpreted the verdict as a product, 
not of racial bias, but of the inherently undesirable stand-your-ground law.”); Megale, supra note 60, at 1072 
(“Until 2012, Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ law had not received much attention[.]  This began to change 
when Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by George Zimmerman and the media descended upon Sanford, 
Florida.”) (internal footnotes omitted).  See also Chelsea J. Carter & Holly Yan, Why this verdict? Five things 
that led to Zimmerman’s acquittal, CNN (July 15, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/14/us/zimmerman-
why-this-verdict/ (identifying the charges filed, evidence presented, key prosecution witness, voices on the 911 
call, and testimony of the trial as the reasons for Zimmerman’s acquittal); Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, 
Zimmerman is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html; Mark Follman & Lauren Williams, 
Actually, Stand Your Ground Played a Major Role in the Trayvon Martin Case, MOTHER JONES (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/07/stand-your-ground-george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin.  See 
generally supra Part II for an in-depth examination of the SYG statutory scheme in Florida, as well as relevant 
discussion of Zimmerman’s trial and surrounding circumstances, upon which the analysis of Part III, Sec. A 
builds. 
 140.  See, e.g., Madison Fair, Note, Dare Defend: Standing for Stand Your Ground, 38 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 153, 163 (2014) (“In general, Americans both understand and accept the inherent limitations of law en-
forcement, for a government able to protect every one of its citizens all the time would be far too oppressive 
and lacking in implicit freedoms that Americans especially hold dear.  In light of law enforcement’s inability to 
completely protect individual citizens at all times, though, citizens must have the legal ability to protect them-
selves.  Stand your ground laws empower victims by enhancing this right to self-protection and showing the 
state stands behind them in the event they are compelled to respond to an attack with deadly force.”) (internal 
footnotes omitted).  But see Weaver, supra note 60, at 423-24, for a discussion of perceived problems with the 
legislature’s rationale for passing the law. 
 141.  See, e.g., Abuznaid, supra note 107, at 1135-36 (“Perhaps the most prominent example of youth mo-
bilization is the Dream Defenders, a Florida-based organization that has focused, in the aftermath of the Trayvon 
Martin killing, on the impact of SYG laws on youth of color.  The Dream Defenders’ 31-day sit-in in the Florida 
State Capitol building in the wake of the verdict acquitting George Zimmerman of all charges related to the 
death of Trayvon Martin[] . . . led the Florida Legislature to hold a hearing to reevaluate Florida’s SYG law.”) 
(internal footnotes omitted); Megale, supra note 60, at 1095-96 (“After a thirty-one-day protest[,] . . . Governor 
Risk Scott called a special legislative session to consider House Bill 4003 that proposed repeal of Florida’s 
[SYG].”).  See also, Kathleen McGrory, Dream Defenders End Sit-In Protest at Capitol in Tallahassee, MIAMI 
HERALD (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/08/15/3564934/dream-defenders-end-sit-in-pro-
test.html; Elizabeth Chuck, Mothers of Victims Plead for Changes to Stand-Your-Ground Laws, NBC NEWS 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/29/21231481-mothers-of-victims-plead-for-
changes-to-stand-your-ground-laws; ASSOCIATED PRESS, Florida lawmakers to vote on ‘stand your ground’ 
repeal, FOX NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/07/florida-lawmakers-to-vote-
on-stand-your-ground-repeal/. 
 142.  See H.B. 4003, 115th Leg., (Fla. 2014, as rejected by Criminal Justice Subcomm.), available at 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/4003/BillText/Filed/PDF; Bill History, Florida Senate, 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/4003 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  See also Sascha Cordner, House 
Panel Rejects Proposal to Repeal Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law, WFSU (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://news.wfsu.org/post/house-panel-rejects-proposal-repeal-floridas-stand-your-ground-law; Marion P. 
Hammer, ALERT: Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law Stood its Ground Against Attack, NRA-ILA (Nov. 8, 
2013), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2013/11/alert!-floridas-stand-your-ground-law-stood-
its-ground-against-attack.aspx. 
 143.  It is widely believed that manslaughter was the appropriate charge to bring against Zimmerman.  See 
supra notes 132-33.  A manslaughter charge may have been met with criticism, arguably going “too easy” on 
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to political and public pressures surrounding the case ultimately undermined her ex-
pertise, the legislative directive of SYG, and the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system.144 
B. Michael Dunn 
 Other Florida cases involving SYG have similarly received media attention and 
roused public opinion concerning enforcement and applicability of the law.145  In 
another headline criminal trial, Corey prosecuted Michael Dunn for the November 
2012 killing of 17 year-old Jordan Davis.146  However, Corey was acting in an elected 
and politically accountable capacity in this prosecution, as the case was tried in her 
own district of Duval County.147  In November 2012, an altercation erupted between 
Dunn and a group of teenagers playing music in their car after Dunn asked them to 
turn down the volume.148  The argument turned violent when Dunn grabbed his hand-
gun and fired into the car, killing Davis.149  Dunn claimed he fired into the car be-
cause he “saw a gun in the [teens’] car” and believed he was in immediate danger.150  
Similarly to Zimmerman, Dunn did not explicitly invoke a SYG defense by motion, 
but instead relied upon its inclusion in the jury instructions as part of his defense.151  
The jury found Dunn guilty on four counts of attempted murder, but was hung on the 
charge of first-degree murder for Davis’s death, again spurring media attention and 
public outrage.152 
 
Zimmerman, it is reasonable to assume public preference of some conviction rather than no conviction. 
 144.  But see Sekhon, supra note 7, at 18 (“Prosecutors’ expressive power is potentially independent of any 
conviction they might secure.  George Zimmerman’s recent acquittal bolsters this point—the trial has impelled 
a national dialogue about race, violence, and self-defense.  It may even be that the acquittal has made for more 
animated political dialogue than a conviction would have.”). 
 145.  While the following cases did not receive nearly as much media attention and public scrutiny as Zim-
merman’s trial, they are nonetheless significant insofar as they perpetuated the debate concerning SYG, and 
kept the issue relevant to the public. 
 146.  See Abuznaid, supra note 107, at 1143-44. 
 147.  See Indictment, State v. Dunn, No. 16-2012-CF-011572-AXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at https://core.duvalclerk.com/CoreCms.aspx.  See also Matt Soergel, Dunn trial brings national focus 
on Florida’s stand-your-ground law, THE FLORIDA TIMES UNION (Feb. 11, 2014), http://jackson-
ville.com/news/metro/2014-02-10/story/dunn-trial-brings-national-focus-floridas-stand-your-ground-law. 
 148.  See Charlotte Alter, Florida Man Who Killed Teen Over Loud Music Dispute Due in Court, TIME 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/02/03/stand-your-ground-michael-dunn-jordan-davis-killing-loud-
music/. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.  However, despite Dunn’s claim that he “saw Jordan Davis point a shotgun at him through the car 
window[,]” the subsequent investigation produced no such gun, nor did any of the witnesses see one.  Abuznaid, 
supra note 107, at 1144. 
 151.  See Abuznaid, supra note 107, at 1144. 
 152.  See DIANE REHM SHOW, The Loud Music Trial and Renewed Debate over Stand-Your-Ground Laws, 
NPR (Feb. 18, 2014), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2014-02-18/loud-music-trial-and-renewed-debate-
over-stand-your-ground-laws (discussing complexities inherent in SYG which makes it “very different to sep-
arate out a provision of the law with the larger law[,]” particularly from the jury’s perspective); Gibson & 
Winkle, infra note 155 (noting that the jury found Dunn guilty “on four of five counts” for the attempted murder 
of the other teenagers in the car, but was deadlocked on the first-degree murder charge).  See also Lisa Bloom, 
4 Reasons Why Stand Your Ground Made a Difference in the Michael Dunn Trial, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-bloom/four-reasons-why-stand-yo_b_4821223.html (“We do not 
yet have a conviction for the killing of Jordan Davis.  The very least we can do is be honest about the law that 
stands in the way of accountability for his killing.”); Ashley Lopez, Dunn Case Puts Stand Your Ground on 
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 Corey received criticism for charging Dunn with first-degree murder for killing 
Jordan Davis.153  It was claimed that Corey’s overcharging Dunn was “due to esca-
lated political pressure and heightened media attention from the Zimmerman 
case.”154  Additionally, Corey sought to retry Dunn for first-degree murder after ini-
tially failing to obtain a conviction.155  The fact that Corey pursued a retrial, without 
regard to the fact that Dunn’s conviction for attempted murder also could have been 
reversed and the entire case lost, implicates politically motivated decision-making 
that undermines the prosecutorial function.156 
 Indeed, it is likely that Corey’s decision to retry Dunn was a response to the 
negative opinion she had garnered in the media and amongst the public after failing 
to obtain a conviction against Zimmerman.157  Securing a conviction of first-degree 
murder for Dunn arguably would have put her back in the good graces of the public, 
or set her up for reelection in her district.158  Whatever her motivation, she promised 
a conviction that she could not deliver.159  In light of the headline nature of the trial, 
Corey’s actions point less towards everyday prosecutorial strategy and more towards 
a political manipulation of her discretion.160 
 
Trial, Again, FCIR (Feb. 21, 2014), http://fcir.org/2014/02/21/dunn-case-puts-stand-your-ground-on-trial-
again-zimmerman-gun-murder-florida/. 
 153.  See, e.g., Erin Donaghue, Did prosecutors in “loud music” trial overcharge shooter?, CBS NEWS 
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-prosecutors-overcharge-accused-loud-music-shooter/; 
Larry Hannan, Did Angela Corey blow it? Experts say state prosecutor has history of overcharging, THE FLOR-
IDA TIMES UNION (Feb. 22, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-02-22/story/did-angela-corey-
blow-it-experts-say-state-prosecutor-has-history (“Dunn should have been charged with second-degree murder, 
not first-degree, because this was not a premeditated murder[.]”); Figueroa, infra note 185 (“Corey has been 
criticized for overcharging all three defendants in her high-profile cases—Zimmerman, Dunn, and Alexander—
all with the desire they accept her plea bargain. . . . In addition, she received a lot of public criticism for failing 
to secure murder charges for Zimmerman and Dunn.”); DIANE REHM SHOW supra note 152 (discussing the 
“amount of anger against State Attorney Angela Corey”).  See also Noah Rothman, Dershowitz: Angela Corey’s 
‘Prosecutorial Ineptitude’ Might Allow Michael Dunn to Walk Free, MEDIAITE (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.me-
diaite.com/tv/dershowitz-angela-corey%E2%80%99s-prosecutorial-ineptitude-might-allow-michael-dunn-to-
walk-free/. 
 154.  Rick Neale & Gary Strauss, Attorney: Dunn ‘overcharged’ due to Trayvon killing, USA TODAY (Feb. 
13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2014/02/13/attorney-says-michael-dunn-overcharged-due-
to—trayvon-martin-death/5457507/. 
 155.  See, e.g., Travis Gibson & Amanda Winkle, Dunn prosecutor: Will retry on first-degree murder, FIRST 
COAST NEWS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/story/news/local/michael-dunn-
trial/2014/02/15/corey-retry-dunn-murder/5519925/; Eliana Dockterman, Both Sides Vow to Fight on in Florida 
Loud Music Case, TIME (Feb. 17, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/02/17/both-sides-vow-to-fight-on-in-
florida-loud-music-case/; Mark O’Mara, Why prosecutor is retrying ‘loud music’ murder case, CNN (Sept. 22, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/omara-loud-music-murder-case-retrial/. 
 156.  See Wanda Carruthers, Dershowitz: Prosecutor Could Lose in ‘Loud Music’ Retrial, NEWSMAX (Feb. 
20, 2014), http://www.newsmax.com/US/Alan-Dershowitz-Florida-CNN-loud-music-kill-
ing/2014/02/20/id/553852/ (discussing Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz’s critical commentary on An-
gela Corey, and his belief that “there was a possibility the attempted murder charges against Dunn would not 
hold up when the case was retried”).  Further, at that time, it was noted in a New York Times article that the 
case would focus more on SYG than race relations, and that “any changes in the state law [as a result of the 
trial] would be unlikely.”  See Soergel, supra note 147. 
 157.  See Yamiche Alcindor & Jordan Friedman, Zimmerman prosecutor takes hit in court of public opinion, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/14/angela-corey-george-
zimmerman-trayvon-martin-murder-florida/2763835/. 
 158.  See O’Mara, supra note 155. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See id.  While prosecutors routinely overcharge in an attempt to pressure a defendant into a plea deal, 
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Because the media attention and public pressures surrounding the Dunn trial mo-
tivated her decision to retry on first-degree murder, Corey acted politically and in 
response to those pressures in her capacity as a prosecutor.  This is further evidenced 
by the proximity in timing between Zimmerman’s acquittal and the announcement of 
Dunn’s retrial, as well as her perceived desire to make a name for herself rather than 
to seek justice.161  Thus, Corey’s discretionary decision to retry Dunn in response to 
public pressures undermined the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, despite 
her being subject to political accountability. 
C. Marissa Alexander 
 The unsuccessful invocation of SYG in the domestic violence context by 
Marissa Alexander prompted public and media criticism to the law once more.162  
Corey, again in an elected and politically accountable capacity, was the prosecutor in 
this case.163  Corey pursued charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon 
against Alexander164 under Florida’s “10-20-Life” law.165 
 In that case, Alexander fired a “warning shot” in the direction of her abusive 
husband during a domestic dispute.166  Despite Alexander’s history of being abused 
 
such tactics are not prudent in headline criminal trials.  Where the public maintains a “thirst for blood,” prose-
cutors usually opt to pursue charges where the likelihood of obtaining a valid conviction at trial is high.  This 
is true in the cases of headline trials, where the public would likely prefer some conviction rather than no con-
viction at all.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that prosecutors will pursue lesser charges against a criminal 
defendant in a high-profile case, and thus be more likely to obtain a conviction and vindicate the perceived 
injustice of a given situation, rather than to overcharge and lowering that probability.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra 
note 5, at 286-88.  See also supra note 115. 
 161.  See, e.g., Alcindor & Friedman, supra note 157; O’Mara, supra note 155; Neale & Strauss, supra note 
154.  See also Hannan, supra note 153; Rothman, supra note 153; Figueroa, infra note 185.  See generally 
Radley Balko, Florida’s Killingest Prosecutor, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/03/13/floridas-killingest-prosecutor/ (examining Corey’s track record in 
prosecuting the Zimmerman, Dunn, and Alexander trials, but also in sending more people to death row than any 
other prosecutor in Florida). 
 162.  See Abuznaid, supra note 107, at 1146–48; see also All Things Considered: Another Florida Case 
Puts Crosshairs On ‘Stand Your Ground’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 1, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/02/01/383121919/another-florida-case-puts-crosshairs-on-stand-your-ground [here-
inafter Crosshairs] (“[A]fter a jury found George Zimmerman not guilty in the death of unarmed black teenager 
Trayvon Martin, people started to pay attention to the Alexander case.”). 
 163.  See Lauren Victoria Burke, Angela Corey Speaks on Marissa Alexander, POLITIC 365 (May 15, 2012), 
http://politic365.com/2012/05/15/angela-corey-speaks-on-marissa-alexander-case/. 
 164.  See Information, State v. Alexander, No. 16-2010-CF-008579-AXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Aug. 26, 
2010), available at https://core.duvalclerk.com/CoreCms.aspx.; see also, Timeline for Marissa Alexander’s Le-
gal Case, FREE MARISSA NOW http://www.freemarissanow.org/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); 
Mitch Stacy, Marissa Alexander Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shot (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (May 19, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/19/marissa-alexander-gets-20_n_1530035.html. 
 165.  See FLA. STAT. § 775.087(1) (“[W]henever a person is charged with a felony[] . . . and during the 
commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon 
or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony 
for which the person is charged shall be reclassified” according to §§ 775.087(1)(a)–(c).); see also Bob Sparks, 
Angela Corey is no stranger to Stand Your Ground, CONTEXTFLORIDA, http://contextflorida.com/bob-sparks-
angela-corey-no-stranger-stand-ground/ (noting that Florida’s 10-20-Life law “calls for 20-year mandatory 
prison sentences for those firing a gun during the commission of a crime”); Jim Piggot, Alexander case high-
lights Florida’s 10-20-Life law, NEWS4JAX (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.news4jax.com/news/alexander-case-
highlights-floridas-1020life-law/30970906. 
 166.  See Crosshairs, supra note 162 (presenting the disputed facts in that case as follows: “[Alexander] 
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at the hands of her estranged husband, Rico Gray, Corey pursued Alexander as the 
aggressor rather than a victim of domestic abuse.167  Alexander rejected a plea deal 
offer from Corey and sought immunity under SYG.168  Abiding by the language of 
the relevant statutory provisions, Duval Circuit Judge James Daniel denied Alexan-
der an evidentiary hearing seeking immunity under SYG.169  Further, Alexander was 
unable to claim self-defense at trial because she could not demonstrate that she had 
suffered “serious bodily injury at the time that she fired the shot[.]”170  Alexander 
was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison under the guidelines of “10-
20-Life,” and controversy ensued amongst the media and the public.171 
 Notably, activists formed the Free Marissa Now Mobilization Campaign, and 
pushed for Alexander’s release from incarceration.172  Corey and her office’s han-
dling of the case came under scrutiny.173  In response, Corey maintained that Alex-
ander was the aggressor in the situation and was properly denied SYG immunity, and 
moreover declared that the public outrage over Alexander’s conviction was mis-
guided.174  However, the First District Court of Appeal later found that the trial judge 
 
claimed that her husband had just beaten her and that he was about to beat her again, that he was charging 
towards her when she fired the shot and that she was not trying to shoot him.  She was just trying to scare him 
off.  Her husband, Rico Gray, and the prosecutors disputed that saying that she didn’t fire the shot at the ceiling, 
she fired it past him into the wall and that it could’ve killed either him or two of his underage children, who 
were both in the room as well.”). 
 167.  See, e.g., Sparks, supra note 165; Sean Davis, No, Marissa Alexander’s Conviction Was Not a “Re-
verse Trayvon Martin” Case in Florida, MEDIATRACKERS (July 16, 2013), http://mediatrackers.org/flor-
ida/2013/07/16/no-marissa-alexanders-conviction-was-not-a-reverse-trayvon-martin-case-in-florida (“Gray 
had a long history of abusing Alexander and multiple other women.  He had previously been charged with 
domestic battery on at least three separate occasions, including charges in 1994, 2006, and 2009.  The 2009 
incident against Alexander sent her to the hospital with head injuries after he shoved her into a bathtub.”).  It is 
important to note, however, that Corey was within her discretion granted by the legislature to pursue charges 
under that provision.  See also Joy-Ann Reid, Angela Corey lashes out at critics of Marissa Alexander prose-
cution, THE GRIO (May 15, 2012), http://thegrio.com/2012/05/15/angela-corey-lashes-out-at-critics-of-marissa-
alexander-prosecution/ (noting that Corey pursued the prosecution because Alexander “was the aggressor, not 
the victim, in the August 2010 incident”). 
 168.  See Sparks, supra note 165 (“Corey offered Alexander a plea deal of three years in prison.  Convinced 
she did nothing wrong or choosing to roll the dice, Alexander rejected the plea deal.  She would stand her 
ground on [SYG].”); see also Notice of Filing Defendant’s Proposed Order Granting Defenses Motion for De-
termination of Immunity from Prosecution and Motion to Dismiss, State v. Alexander, No. 16-2010-CF-
008579-AXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://docslide.us/documents/notice-of-filing-
for-determination-of-immunity-and-motion-to-dismiss.html. 
 169.  See Sparks, supra note 165 (“Duval Circuit Judge James Daniel rejected the [SYG] defense by saying 
Alexander could have run out of the house to avoid further confrontation with Gray.”); Susan Cooper Eastman, 
Florida Woman Who Fired ‘Warning Shot’ Denied Self-Defense Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/florida-woman-warning-shot_n_5606101.html; see also Cross-
hairs, supra note 162 (“What the judge found was that by advancing back into the house, she lost her right to 
claim [SYG].”). 
 170.  See Abuzniad, supra note 107, at 1147. 
 171.  See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 169; Stacy, supra note 164; Burke, supra note 163.; see also Touré, 
Where was ‘Stand Your Ground’ for Marissa Alexander?, TIME (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/30/where-was-stand-your-ground-for-marissa-alexander/ (“It seems to make 
sense that a woman who was in a physical fight in her home with an admitted habitual domestic abuser against 
whom she has legal protection should be entitled to stand her ground.  Alexander told officers that she feared 
for her life.”). 
 172.  See FREE MARISSA NOW, http://www.freemarissanow.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 173.  See Burke, supra note 163. 
 174.  See Reid, supra note 167 (“Corey remains certain about the prosecution.  And she says people who 
are making judgments about the unfairness of the case are misguided. . . . Corey dismissed speculation that the 
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erred in his jury instructions by shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to 
the defendant.175  As a result, Alexander’s conviction was overturned and a new trial 
ordered.176 
 In response, Corey announced that the State would pursue three consecutive 
twenty-year sentences against Alexander instead of concurrent sentences.177  Alex-
ander again sought pretrial immunity under SYG in light of legislative revision to the 
law—revision that had been inspired, in part, by the public pressures emanating from 
Alexander’s case.178  The “warning shot” bill, which was signed into law by Gover-
nor Rick Scott on June 20, 2014, expanded SYG to include persons who fire a warn-
ing shot or threaten to use a firearm in self-defense.179  Unfortunately for Alexander, 
Judge Daniel denied her request for a new immunity determination, finding that the 
expansion of SYG to include warning shots could not be applied retroactively.180  
Instead of going back to trial, Alexander accepted a plea deal for three years in prison 
including time served.181 
 Marissa Alexander’s case has become the representative domestic violence case 
under SYG.182  In that case, as compared to Zimmerman’s, Corey did not succumb 
to public or political pressures in her charging decision.  Rather, she acted within the 
realm of discretion granted to her by the legislature in an executive capacity.  Further, 
the media attention and public outcry garnished in response to Alexander’s headline 
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criminal trial pushed the legislature to amend SYG in a way that legitimizes the crim-
inal justice system.183  What arguably may have undermined the prosecutorial func-
tion in that case, however, is Corey’s apparent lack of consideration for Alexander as 
a victim of domestic violence.184  Indeed, Corey’s pursuit of a sixty-year sentence 
upon retrial—three times Alexander’s original sentence—may appear somewhat vin-
dictive.185  Yet her refusal to allow the media or public opinion impact her decisions, 
and instead bring charges as she saw fit, was proper.186  Whether the process or out-
come of Alexander’s trial appears unjust in the eyes of the public, Corey remained 
accountable to the citizens of Duval Count who were able to call for her resignation 
or refuse to reelect her as their State Attorney.187  In this respect, Corey’s exercise of 
discretion with regard to Alexander, as opposed to Zimmerman or Dunn, was legiti-
mate. 188 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 The trials of George Zimmerman, Michael Dunn, and Marissa Alexander are 
three significant headline criminal trials that have garnered considerable debate over 
Florida’s SYG regime.189  The substantial media coverage of those cases allows for 
close scrutiny of the prosecutorial discretion afforded under that law.  Incidentally, 
Angela Corey conducted each of those prosecutions, prompting a thorough examina-
tion of her decision-making in three of Florida’s most notorious SYG cases.  The 
surrounding facts, circumstances, and sociopolitical climate impacted Corey’s pros-
ecutorial decisions.190  Furthermore, that environment provides insight as to whether 
prosecutors, legislators, and the public normatively function in a way that legitimizes 
the criminal justice system in the context of headline trials. 
In the Zimmerman and Dunn trials, Corey improperly exercised her discretion 
by succumbing to public pressures and engaging in politically motivated decision-
making.  
Corey’s resolution to bypass a grand jury and charge George Zimmerman with 
second-degree murder in her capacity as an appointed special prosecutor undercut the 
initial decision of elected prosecutor Wolfinger.  Moreover, it disregarded the statu-
tory directive of SYG and consideration for the likelihood of conviction against the 
accused.191  Law enforcement’s failure to establish probable cause for Zimmerman’s 
arrest lowered the prosecution’s chance of successfully obtaining a conviction at 
trial.192  Not only did Corey yield to political demand by filing charges against Zim-
merman, she pursued a charge that was not supported by the facts of the case, and 
ultimately failed to satisfy the public’s punitive impulse to vindicate the injustice of 
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ville.com/news/crime/2014-02-26/story/state-attorney-settles-lawsuit-former-nassau-employee (discussing 
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Trayvon Martin’s death. 
Similarly, Corey’s decision to retry Michael Dunn on a charge of first-degree 
murder functioned to weaken the integrity of the criminal justice system.  Corey ar-
guably overcharged Dunn with first-degree murder and was motivated by sociopolit-
ical forces.193  SYG functioned in that case by way of argument and jury instruction 
to produce a hung jury on the charge of first-degree murder for the death of Jordan 
Davis.194  In response, Corey undertook to retry Dunn on the first-degree murder 
charge at the possible expense of vacating Dunn’s conviction altogether.195  Although 
Corey remained accountable to the citizens of her district in that case, she frustrated 
the prosecutorial function by promising an unattainable conviction and engaging in 
risky decision-making.196 
Arguably, the only situation where Corey’s actions did not undermine the valid-
ity of the criminal justice system was in the trial of Marissa Alexander.  While that 
case disregarded the underlying issue of domestic violence and the applicability of 
SYG to domestic abuse victims,197 Corey’s exercise of discretion was not reactive to 
public pressures.198  Instead, she employed standard prosecutorial techniques to ob-
tain a plea bargain by offering a lesser sentence than Alexander faced under Florida’s 
“10-20-Life” law.199  Additionally, Alexander received a new trial upon appeal be-
cause of an erroneous jury instruction rather than a unilateral decision by the prose-
cutor.200 
Significantly, as a result of Alexander’s trial and the surrounding controversy, 
the Florida legislature enacted amendments to SYG.201  That legislation would have 
brought Alexander’s actions within the protection of SYG as originally intended.  
Unfortunately, the new law did not apply retroactively.202  Still, the legislative re-
sponse to public indignation at the injustice of Alexander’s situation, coupled with 
an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, identifies the manner in which 
these actors may function to legitimize the criminal justice system.  The relationship 
between prosecutors, the public, and legislators in the context of headline criminal 
trials has the power to provoke important dialogue and generate necessary legal 
change. 
 Indeed, Florida’s SYG law has not been applied uniformly across cases, thereby 
producing results that contravene its intended purpose.203  It is moreover argued that 
SYG violates a number of international human rights, including the right to life, the 
 
 193.  See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See Bloom, supra note 152. 
 195.  See Gibson & Winkle, supra note 155 (“After Michael Dunn was found guilty on four of five 
counts[,] . . . State Attorney Angela Corey said she intends to retry Dunn on the outstanding first-degree murder 
charge[:] . . . a charge on which the jury deadlocked.”). 
 196.  See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
 197.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 198.  See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
 200.  See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. 
 201.  See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See, e.g., Hundley, supra note 189. 
88 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:1 
right to equality and non-discrimination, and the right to due process and court ac-
cess, among others.204  The uncertainty surrounding SYG calls for speculation on its 
applicability to any altercation that evidences some remote possibility that it will be 
invoked.205  The stable controversy concerning SYG will continue to bring prosecu-
torial decision-making under scrutiny, particularly in cases receiving significant me-
dia attention.  At the end of the day, the future applicability of Florida’s SYG law 
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